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For better or for worse, recent developments have tended to shift the
international comparison of economic growth from the leisurely delibera-
tion by social scientists to the hectic arena of international politics. The
drive for economic development in uncommitted countries has been made
a prime object of contention in the present era of "competitive coexist-
ence." The Soviet challenge has recently been extended to the capitalist
world by setting up the rate of growth as a measure of performance in a
test of the comparative efficiency of economic and political systems. For
their own part, the industrial countries of the West have become more
sensitive to full employment and economic growth, not just as an under-
pinning of military strength or political power, but as a deliberate goal of
national policy in its own right.
As a result, calls for comparisons of strength and rates of progress
have become more frequent, and the lack of reasonably unambiguous
answers more painful to those concerned with the policy implications of
growth problems. In our current research project on the "Economics of
Competitive Coexistence" at the National Planning Association, the need
to compare growth trends and immediately to hedge the evaluation with
numerous qualifications is a persistent companion. What is at stake is the
insufficiency of our traditional aggregative measures of growth as a base
for quantitative prediction, extrapolation, or mere evaluation—in descend-
ing order of ambitiousness.
Let me use the controversial field of Russian economic growth as an
example. High Soviet claims have set up an inviting target to shoot at,
and there has been plenty of sniping. We know the statistical pitfalls and
we have witnessed some spectacular feats of gymnastics in attack and
defense. But the pitfalls are not all statistical. Just as critical, and harder
to define, are the limits of inference from growth aggregates. If growth
rates have been similar over one period, what follows for the future? If
growth rates have differed, will they tend to pull further apart or converge
103later? Do higher rates imply greater strength or more welfare? Do similar
rates mean equal potentialities, and if so, for what?
At this point qualitative evaluation takes over, as it must eventually in
all economic analysis. But economics is a quantitative science, at least
conceptually, and the economist should be ever alive to opportunities of
translating qualitative factors into quantitative notions for better integra-
tion within our traditional frame of reference. The difficulty of interdis-
ciplinary research is only in part one of language; in fraternizing with the
other sciences, the economist sometimes neglects to assimilate as much as
possible the noneconomic factors with his own concepts.
A concrete example may help to make my point. In the fifties some
Western countries grew probably about as fast as the Soviet Union. To
some observers this serves as a consolation in the competitive struggle, an
indication that planned economies do not necessarily or systematically
grow faster than market economies. Implicitly, they extrapolate parallel
growth trends, in contrast to those who imply a steeper slope of growth
curves for the centrally directed system. The underlying institutional
difference is thus recognized as a potential governing factor, but it is not
made explicit in the absence of quantitative characteristics that could be
weighed along with the growth statistics.
As a substitute, "types" or "stages" of growth have been submitted as
ordinal categories of distinction. The technique of typology, so much in
line with German historical tradition, has again been applied to economic
growth by economists such as Hoffmann and Baerwald. Rostow's concept
of the "take-off" is probably the latest and most lively application of the
"stage" technique. Both classifications have the drawback of imprecise
or arbitrary demarcation, which makes them hard to apply to practical
situations and may well fail to do justice to borderline cases of special
interest in dynamic situations.
I submit that it would be worth trying to circumscribe some institutional
and other nonquantitative criteria in a more flexible manner. It has
been found practical to circumscribe such a complex concept as the level
of living by a number of indicators derived from diverse fields like vital
statistics, health, caloric intake, housing, education, etc. While none of
them is singly a satisfactory measure, in their totality they succeed in giving
a useful composite picture that, in a modest way, is better than the sum
of its parts. Why should it not be possible to devise a fair number of
judiciously selected indicators that add up to an approximation of various
qualitative characteristics, which could help in evaluating factors govern-
ing the inference from statistical growth trends?
For instance, in my earlier example the hunch that a centrally directed
economy might have a more systematic tendency toward sustained growth
than a laissez faire economy of the classic type may well be sound. How-
given a similar growth-oriented policy, a not centrally planned
economy—e.g. one operating through different, incentive-directed institu-
tions—might conceivably achieve comparable sustained rates of growth.
104On this assumption, indicators of "deliberateness" might be devised that
feature ratios (such as income-investment ratios, etc.) and institutional
factors (such as growth of development-oriented intermediaries, measures
of incentive-generated results, growth-characteristic structural shifts, etc.).
The only reason why these indicators of "deliberateness" have not been
called indicators of planning is to avoid a too narrow interpretation of the
word; but the progressing efficacy of techniques of projection (on which
the National Planning Association keeps working continuously) and of
policy implementation might, in turn, with time become the object of
subindicators.
I would like to point to just one more field of application that is related
to the preceding theme of institutional development, one that is deliberately
removed from the direction of resources frequently and unjustly indenti-
fled with the notion of planning. On two previous occasions,1 I analyzed the
stifling effect of uncertainty and ignorance due to lack of the experience
and information that would reduce the pioneer's risk to manageable
proportions. This implies a need for policies designed to reduce both the
factual risks and the personal sense of uncertainty of would-be entre-
preneurs. The growth of counseling or promotional institutions and a
picture of broadening entrepreneurship might well be expressed in a
number of indicators—of varying comprehensiveness and quality, to be
sure, but nonetheless approximations of factors so far deemed totally
beyond the pale of quantitative evaluation. Economic historians have
often had to make do with less, and where growth consciousness is increas-
ing, a measure of curiosity and inventiveness on the part of growth econo-
mists may hope to unearth unexpected sources of information—or with
time promote them as a matter of deliberate policy.
These are random examples jotted down at the shortest of notice. They
are intended only as pointers to a somewhat novel approach and, I believe,
to uses to which a purposeful search for new methods might profitably be
directed. I am unable to anticipate at this time the full scope of such useful-
ness, while it is all too easy to point to the much more obvious difficulties
and obstacles. Yet I submit that an organized effort involving some hard
thinking and much backbreaking research and subsequent testing is bound
to yield some results. They could hardly fail to build a bridge—wide or
narrow, as the case might be—between the traditional aggregate statistics
and the intuitive interpretation on which the economist invariably has to
fall back when his facilities for rationalization have been exhausted.
1 HenryG. Aubrey, "Investment Decisions in Underdeveloped Countries" in
Capital Formation and Economic Growth, Princeton for National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1955, and idem, "Industrial Investment Decisions: A Com-
parative Analysis," Journal of Economic History, December 1955.
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